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The COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent lockdown brought about an exogenous 
and unparalleled stock market crash. The crisis thus provides a unique opportunity to 
test theories of environmental and social (ES) policies. This paper shows that stocks 
with higher ES ratings have significantly higher returns, lower return volatility, and 
higher operating profit margins during the first quarter of 2020. ES firms with higher 
advertising expenditures experience higher stock returns, and stocks held by more ES-
oriented investors experience less return volatility during the crash. This paper 
highlights the importance of customer and investor loyalty to the resiliency of ES stocks. 
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The predominant view of socially responsible firms is that they maximize shareholder welfare by 
engaging in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) activities (e.g., McWilliams and Siegel 
2001). This view is often summarized as “doing well by doing good”: ESG activities are good for 
shareholders, while striving for big social goals. The opposite view on ESG activities is predicated on 
the notion, usually attributed to Friedman (1970), that those activities are just a manifestation of 
managerial agency problems between shareholders and managers. In this view, managers engage in 
ESG activities that will generate benefits to them at the expense of shareholders.1  
 
For quite some time now, practitioners have taken the view that ESG activities create value for firms 
and their shareholders. For example, McKinsey’s 2019 Global Survey on ESG programs reports that a 
large majority of executives and investment professionals agree that ESG policies increase shareholder 
value (McKinsey & Company 2020). The same was true already in their 2009 survey. The academic 
literature has shown a positive association between ESG and financial performance.2 The difficulty, 
though, lies in identifying the direction of causality and the underlying mechanisms: is it the case that 
firms with strong financial performance can afford to engage in ESG activities, or is it that ESG 
activities add value to shareholders? This paper addresses the empirical challenge by positing that the 
COVID-19 pandemic is an exogenous shock that allows us to study the causal link from ESG to 
financial performance.3 
 
We argue that the COVID-19 pandemic presents an unparalleled shock. First, the COVID-19 crisis and 
the subsequent economic lockdown is an unexpected shock to global stock markets. Second, it is an 
exogenous shock that originated out of public health concerns, not because of economic conditions. 
Third, the pandemic resulted in a stock market crash. The stock market in the United States peaked on 
February 19, and a mere month later prices had declined by almost 30%. The unexpected and exogenous 
nature of the shock and its speed suggest that firms had very limited ability to respond in a timely 
fashion to the unfolding crisis.  Thus, the stock market reacted mostly to firms’ preexisting conditions 
that affected their ability to endure the crisis. Overall, these aspects of the crisis create the opportunity 




1 Benabou and Tirole (2010) discuss three possible views of corporate ESG activities: ESG activities motivate 
firms to adopt a longer-term perspective; ESG activities are delegated prosocial behaviors; and ESG activities are 
insider-initiated corporate philanthropy.  
2 See, for example, the meta-analyses of ESG activities and financial performance by Orlitzky, Schmidt, and 
Rynes (2003), Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh (2010), and Busch and Friede (2018). 
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To understand why the COVID-19 shock is useful to study the ESG-financial performance link, 
consider the following two theories of ESG activities based on customer and investor preferences.  
Albuquerque, Koskinen, and Zhang (2019) present a model where firms invest in ESG policies as a 
product differentiation strategy (e.g., Patagonia uses only organic cotton in its outdoor clothing and 
supports conservation efforts; Apple is switching to 100% renewable energy;  and TOMS donates a pair 
of shoes for every pair bought). The benefit of this strategy is a more loyal customer base and a lower 
price-elasticity of demand for their products. A less price-elastic demand gives the firm the ability to 
charge higher prices and have higher profit margins. In their model, the higher profit margin lowers 
operating leverage and thus systematic risk, and increases firm value. If the COVID-19 shock affects 
consumer demand, customer loyalty for ESG firms is hypothesized to benefit ESG firms’ stock 
performance and resiliency.  
 
The literature on sustainable and responsible investments (SRI) provides another hypothesis of how the 
COVID-19 shock affects the ESG-financial performance link. This literature has shown that ESG 
investors—investors with a preference for ESG stocks—are less sensitive to SRI funds’ performance 
relative to conventional mutual funds’ performance (Bollen 2007; Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang 
2011).4 If the COVID-19 shock affects an investor’s attitude toward risk, with many investors selling 
their holdings, the SRI literature suggests that ESG investors are more resilient compared to investors 
in other stocks.5 Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner (2001) develop a model of segmented capital markets 
based on investor preferences where a polluting firm, held by only a subset of investors, is less 
diversified and therefore carries greater systematic risk relative to other firms. Consequently, green 
firms, arguably firms with high ESG ratings, have higher valuations. If the COVID-19 shock led 
investors to flee the market, but less so for those ESG investors, then the price of ESG stocks should 
not decline as much, relative to the price of other stocks. 
 
These two theories predict that stocks with high ESG ratings are more resilient relative to other stocks 
in the rampant stock market sell-off during the first quarter of 2020. Each theory offers a specific, 
though not necessarily mutually exclusive, mechanism that we also test in this paper.  
 
We focus on the environmental and social (ES) aspects of ESG to avoid capturing a governance effect. 
Consistent with the paper’s main prediction, our first result is that first quarter abnormal returns are 
significantly correlated with ES ratings in the cross-section, even after controlling for the usual firm 
 
4 Using data from Morningstar on the sustainability of mutual funds to explore how fund investments are 
allocated, Hartzmark and Sussman (2019) show evidence that investors value sustainability due to nonfinancial 
motives and biases in performance expectations.  
5 In fact, the Financial Times reports increasing fund flows into ESG ETFs at the same time that conventional 
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characteristics, including size, cash to assets, Tobin's q, dividend yield, volatility, leverage, and 
industry. Next, we examine more closely the relation between the returns for firms with high ES ratings 
and the COVID-19 pandemic by using daily data and conducting a difference-in-differences analysis 
inside the first quarter of 2020. We estimate a difference-in-differences regression of firm-level daily 
abnormal returns with a COVID-19 event date of February 24,6 when the stock market decline 
accelerated. We include a second event date of March 18, when President Trump signed the second 
Coronavirus Emergency Aid Package, which is the start of an aggressive fiscal and monetary policy 
response to the pandemic. We control for the second event because we wish to have a cleaner 
identification of the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic. We add firm and day fixed effects to control 
for any other unobservable effects, and cluster the standard errors by firm and day. We find that firms 
with high ES ratings earn an extra daily return of 0.45% from February 24 until March 17 relative to 
firms with low ES ratings, for a cumulative difference of 7.2%. We conduct a formal test of parallel 
trends, and do not reject the parallel trends assumption. 
 
We complement the difference-in-differences regressions with a less parametric study of the relation 
between the returns to ES ratings and the COVID-19 pandemic. Following Ramelli and Wagner 
(forthcoming), we estimate daily cross-sectional regressions of cumulative abnormal returns of U.S.-
listed firms and inspect the evolution of the loading on ES ratings over time. We find that the loading 
on ES ratings is flat from January 1, 2020, until the end of February, which suggests no significant 
return difference between high- and low-ES firms prior to the COVID-19 shock and, as a by-product, 
supports the parallel trends assumption. The loading on ES ratings then steadily increases until it 
plateaus around mid-March, consistent with ES stocks being more resilient during the COVID-19 
market crash. 
 
Consistent with the resiliency hypothesis, we also document that high ES-rated firms display lower 
volatility of stock returns during the first quarter of 2020. We do this two ways. First, we compute the 
standard deviation of daily log returns, raw and capital asset pricing model (CAPM) adjusted, for the 
first quarter of 2020 and use cross-sectional regression models to study the effect of ES policies on 
volatility. Second, we use a range-based volatility measure (the daily high price minus the daily low 
price divided by the average price) and estimate difference-in-differences regressions using daily data. 
We find that volatility is lower for highly rated ES firms under both approaches and for the various 
measures of volatility.  
 
 
6 The S&P 500 peaked on February 19, 2020. On Friday, February 21, several municipalities in Northern Italy 
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Next, we study the operating performance of firms with high ES ratings relative to other firms during 
the first quarter of 2020. In contrast to stock returns, accounting numbers will take some time to fully 
reflect the worsening economic situation and firms’ response to it. This analysis is thus just a first step 
to a more in depth study as additional data become available. We find that firms with high ES ratings 
realize higher operating profit margins in the first quarter of 2020 relative to the last quarter of 2019 
viz-à-viz other firms, consistent with predictions from Albuquerque, Koskinen, and Zhang (2019). We 
also find that asset turnover (i.e., ratio of sales to assets) is lower for firms with high ES ratings relative 
to other firms during the period. High ES firms appear to have been able to increase their margins even 
as sale proceeds declined. Finally, we find no difference in return on assets for firms with high ES 
ratings relative to other firms during the first quarter of 2020.  
 
To answer the question of how ES policies help build resiliency, we further investigate the two theories 
of customer and investor loyalty presented above. In Albuquerque, Koskinen, and Zhang (2019), ES is 
a product differentiation strategy. Since some markets are more competitive than others, we use 
advertising expenditures as a way to capture firms’ ability to acquire customer loyalty. We therefore 
expect stronger results for firms with both high ES and advertising expenditures. We show that the 
effect on stock returns is twice as large for firms with high ES ratings coupled with high advertising 
expenditures compared to firms with high ES ratings but low advertising. This evidence is consistent 
with prior research (Servaes and Tamayo 2013; Albuquerque, Koskinen, and Zhang 2019). To test the 
investor loyalty mechanism, we construct a variable that measures the ES preferences of institutional 
investors. If firms with high ES ratings have owners with a preference for those stocks, then these firms 
should perform relatively better during a market sell-off. We find a positive, but insignificant effect of 
investor preferences on stock returns. Economically, the effect from investor preferences is about half 
the size of the effect from advertising expenditures. We note that these results are obtained in difference-
in-differences regressions where we include firm and day fixed effects to control for unobserved 
constant effects, and also cluster standard errors by firm and day. 
 
We also test the ability of these variables to explain the changes in the volatility of stock returns. We 
find a strong negative effect of investor preferences on range-based volatility in firms with high ES 
ratings. In contrast, our results show a negative, but insignificant effect on volatility for firms with high 
ES ratings coupled with high advertising expenditures. Overall, our evidence suggests that both 
mechanisms affect the return performance of high ES firms, relative to other firms (consistent with the 
findings in Gantchev, Giannetti, and Li 2019).  Customer loyalty, however, is a more important factor 
in explaining the level of stock returns, besides being consistent with the operating profit margin results, 
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Because of ESG ratings disagreements between different rating agencies (e.g. Berg, Koelbel, and 
Rigobon 2020), we use ES ratings from Thomson Reuters Refinitiv for our main results, but we find 
similar results using MSCI ES scores. One alternative explanation for our main finding is that the oil 
price decline in the first quarter of 2020 affected particularly firms in the energy sector, which are 
known to score low in some dimensions of ES. We repeat the analysis excluding firms in the energy 
sector from our sample. We find even stronger results. Another alternative explanation is that some 
businesses were considered “essential” and kept on operating in a normal fashion. We show that the 
documented resiliency of high ES-rated firms applies also within each industry, ruling out the essential-
firms argument. It is also plausible that our results are driven by corporate governance, since Ferrell, 
Liang, and Renneboog (2016) show that well-governed firms invest more in ES policies. However, we 
show that our results for ES stocks cannot be explained by a good corporate governance effect. 
 
Stocks with high ES ratings were not the only stocks to perform better during the first quarter of 2020. 
Acharya and Steffen (forthcoming) provide evidence that firms with access to liquidity perform better 
during the first quarter. Ramelli and Wagner (forthcoming) show that nonfinancial firms with higher 
cash holdings and lower financial leverage are less affected than other firms. Similar evidence is also 
provided by Fahlenbrach, Rageth, and Stulz (2020). Alfaro et al. (2020) and Hassan et al. (2020) show 
that stocks that are less exposed to the COVID-19 pandemic perform better. Pagano, Wagner, and 
Zechner (2020) demonstrate that firms that are less affected by social distancing have higher returns 
during the crisis. Landier and Thesmar (2020) demonstrate that changes in analysts’ forecasts about 
future corporate earnings explain the overall decline, but not the short-term price movements, in stock 
prices during COVID-19. Shan and Tang (2020) document that Chinese firms with greater employee 
satisfaction appear to endure the COVID-19 stock market downturn better than other firms, supporting 
employee satisfaction as one dimension of ES policies creating shareholder value (Edmans 2011). In a 
cross-country analysis, Ding et al. (2020) provide evidence that firms with stronger balance sheets, less 
exposure to COVID-19, and more sustainable operations perform better during the first quarter. 
Cheema-Fox et al. (2020) show that firms that protect their workforce and supply chains during the 
stock market collapse have higher returns than other firms.  
 
In addition to affecting stock prices, COVID-19 dramatically affected corporate financing. Li, Strahan, 
and Zhang (forthcoming) document an unprecedented increase in commercial and industrial loans in 
banks’ balance sheets, as nonfinancial corporations draw funds from credit lines during the three last 
weeks in March. Halling, Yu, and Zechner (forthcoming) present evidence that bond issuance increases 
significantly after the middle of March, especially for highly rated bonds.  Firms choose to issue bonds 
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Several recent papers have asserted a positive causal link from ESG activities to firms’ financial 
performance. El Ghoul et al. (2011) employ instrumental variables estimation and dynamic panel data 
methods to show causality from ESG activities to lower cost of capital. Albuquerque, Koskinen, and 
Zhang (2019) similarly use instrumental variables estimation to demonstrate a causal link from ESG to 
reduced systematic risk and increased valuations. Dimson, Karakas, and Li  (2015) and Krüger (2015) 
use event-study analyses to link ESG events to subsequent firm financial performance; their method 
alleviates concerns about reverse causality and omitted variables. Flammer (2015) employs the 
regression discontinuity design to show that successful shareholder ESG proposals result in positive 
abnormal returns. Masulis and Reza (2015), however, use the 2003 Tax Reform Act, which reduced 
personal tax rates on dividends, as an exogenous event to show that corporate giving—a component of 
ESG policies—reduces shareholder wealth. Their findings support the agency costs viewpoint. 
 
In their paper studying the Great Recession of 2008–2009, a major economic shock, Lins, Servaes, and 
Tamayo (2017) show that U.S. nonfinancial firms with high ES ratings had better financial performance 
than other firms.7 The current crisis is very different from the Great Recession for the speed and nature 
of the shock. In the 2-year duration of the Great Recession, firms had plenty of opportunities to adjust 
to the crisis and new government policies.8 Thus, the Great Recession is a noisier setting in which to 
identify the effect of ESG on stock market performance because of the length of the economic shock. 
Second, the current shock is an unpredictable public health shock that is exogenous to the U.S. 
economy. In contrast, the Great Recession was economically driven and its origins in the financial 
sector led to widely held mistrust for financial firms. A confounding effect between ES policies and 
trust potentially limits our ability to discern whether the good performance of firms with high ES ratings 
in 2007–2008 is attributable to ES policies or to trust in general. 
 
1. Data and Methodology 
 
1.1 Sample and summary statistics  
 
Our main data source on firms’ ES performance is Thomson Reuters’ Refinitiv ESG database. We 
include all U.S. stocks in the Refinitiv database. Refinitiv collects information from corporate annual 
reports, sustainability reports, nongovernmental organizations, and news sources for publicly traded 
companies at an annual frequency. Refinitiv ESG evaluates firms’ environmental (E) performance in 
three categories: resource use, emissions, and innovation. Social (S) commitments are measured in four 
 
7 Cornett, Erhemjamts, and Tehranian (2016) show that U.S. banks' financial performance during the Great 
Recession is positively related to their ESG score. 
8 Dai, Rau, and Tan (2020) demonstrate that firms increase their ESG scores during times of heightened 
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areas: workplace, human rights, community, and product responsibility. Governance (G) is evaluated 
in three dimensions: management, shareholders, and corporate social responsibility strategy. Each 
subcategory contains several ESG themes. For example, the resource use category contains four themes:  
water, energy, sustainable packaging, and environmental supply chain. The emission category covers 
themes of CO2 emissions, waste, biodiversity, and environmental management systems. The ESG 
subcategory on workforce includes four themes: diversity and inclusion; career development and 
training; working conditions; and health and safety. The scores are based on the relative performance 
and materiality of ESG factors within the firm’s sector (for E and S) and country (for G) and range from 
0 to 100. Thomson Reuters’ Refinitiv ESG scores have been used in the prior literature (e.g., Ferrell, 
Liang, and Renneboog 2016; Dyck et al. 2019). Our main measure, ES, is the average of the 
environment and social scores in 2018, expressed as a percentage. We thus omit the governance score.  
 
We obtain daily stock returns from Capital IQ North America Daily for the first quarter of 2020 and 
CRSP from 2017 to 2019. The daily abnormal return is estimated as the difference between the daily 
logarithm return (i.e., the logarithm of gross return) of a stock and the CAPM beta times the daily 
logarithm return of the market.9 The CAPM beta is estimated using daily returns from 2017 and 2019, 
and the S&P 500 as the market index. Similarly, the quarterly abnormal return is the difference between 
the logarithm of the stock’s gross quarterly return and the CAPM beta times the logarithm of the 
market’s gross quarterly return. We then calculate the volatility of stock returns, both raw and CAPM 
adjusted. 
 
Accounting data for 2019 are obtained from Compustat and are used to construct control variables, 
namely, Tobin’s q, Size, Cash, Leverage, Return on equity, Advertising, and Dividend yield. We 
winsorize all  accounting variables at the 1% level in each tail. Table A1 in the appendix defines all 
variables used in the paper. After matching all data sets, our sample consists of 134,689 firm-day return 
observations for 2,171 distinct firms. Table 1 presents summary statistics.  
 
Insert Table 1 here. 
 
We construct a firm-level investor ES measure based on institutional investors revealed preferences. 
Investors’ ES preference is estimated using institutional investors’ equity holdings, following recent 
studies (Starks, Venkat, and Zhu 2018; Gibson et al. 2019). We measure institutional ownership using 
Thomson Reuters’ 13F database, which reports institutional investors’ equity holdings. We merge the 
13F investor holding data with Refinitiv ESG data for U.S. stocks. To construct the measure, we first 
measure an investor’s ES preference as the value-weighted average Refinitiv ES score of its portfolio 
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holdings for each quarter in 2018 and then average across the four quarters.10 Investor-based ES score 
of a firm is measured as the weighted average of its investors’ ES preference based on first quarter of 
2019 holdings. We construct the measure for 2,123 stocks in the Refinitiv ESG database where the 13F 
investor holding data is available. 
 
1.2 Empirical design  
 
To study the effect of ES on corporate financial performance, we run two sets of regressions. Our main 
set of results uses difference-in-differences regression specifications to better identify the effect of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. We also use cross-sectional regressions of firms’ quarterly stock market 
performance. The cross-sectional regressions provide less clean estimates of the effect of the crisis, 
because of the fiscal response that ensued, but provides some external validity by not being tied to a 
specific shock date. Also, the cross-sectional regressions are comparable with the operating 
performance regressions for which we only have quarterly data.  
 
Consider first the cross-sectional regression specification:  
 
Performancei = ß0 + ß1ESi + ß2Firm controlsi + ß3Industry FEi + i. (1) 
 
We use this specification to study the behaviour of three different dependent variables: quarterly 
abnormal returns, return volatility (total and idiosyncratic volatility), and operating performance 
(measured by return on assets, operating profit margin, and asset turnover). The unit of observation is 
firm i during the first quarter of 2020. The independent variable of interest, ES, is the environmental 
and social rating of firm i in 2018. We control for several firm characteristics.  For stock return and 
volatility regressions, we control for Tobin's q, Size, Cash, Leverage, Return on equity, Advertising, 
Historical volatility, and Dividend yield of firm i in 2019, and use ordinary least squares. For operating 
performance regressions, we control for Tobin's q, Cash, and Leverage of firm i in 2019, and use median 
regressions, following Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). We run regression specifications with and 
without industry fixed effects based on the Fama and French 12 industry of firm i. Standard errors are 
robust to heteroscedasticity. 
 
 
10 An inspection of Table 1 reveals that Investor-based ES is much higher than firm ES. We have reconstructed 
an equal-weight investor ES measure. That is, in this new measure, we first equal-weight ES scores of firms held 
by an investor. This first step is different from our current measure that uses value weights. In a second step, we 
follow our previous procedure by value-weighting these scores into the firm-level measure. The new measure is 
much closer to firm-level ES. This is because investor portfolios are tilted to larger firms and larger firms tend to 
have more ES. The results using this new measure are very similar to our value-weighted measure, suggesting 
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In our main tests of difference-in-differences regressions, we run the following daily regressions: 
 
Stock performanceit = ß0 + ß1ES_treatmenti × Post_COVIDt   
+ ß2ES_treatmenti × Post_fiscalt + ß3Firm FEi + ß4Day FEt + it. (2) 
 
The two dependent variables we study are daily abnormal returns and daily return volatility (measured 
by daily price range) of firm i on day t during the first quarter of 2020. ES_treatment is a dummy 
variable that equals one for firm i if its ES rating is ranked in the top quartile in 2018, and zero otherwise. 
Post_COVID equals one from February 24 to March 31, 2020, and zero before this period. Post_fiscal 
equals one from March 18 to March 31, 2020, and zero before this period. We control for the second 
event to have a cleaner identification of the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic. We include firm and 
day fixed effects to control for any other unobservable effects, and cluster the standard errors by firm 
and day.  
 
To understand our choice of event window for Post_COVID and Post_fiscal, consider Figure 1. Figure 
1 depicts S&P 500 performance during the first quarter of 2020, with two dates highlighted: February 
24 and March 18, 2020. These dates are used to identify the pandemic shock in our difference-in-
differences regressions. February 24 is the start of the “fever” period in Ramelli and Wagner 
(forthcoming). It is also the first trading day after the first lockdown in Europe, in Northern Italy. We 
construct a second event dummy to isolate the effect of the U.S. fiscal and monetary policy response to 
the pandemic on firms’ stock returns. March 18 is the day that President Trump signed the second 
Coronavirus Emergency Aid Package (CEAP) (the Families First Corona Response Act). March 18 is 
also the date the Federal Reserve begins making purchases under the Commercial Paper Funding 
Facility to alleviate the strain in short-term credit markets. The first CEAP signed on March 6 into law 
is a very small package of $8.3 billion targeted to combat the spread of Coronavirus. The third and 
largest CEAP (the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act) is signed by President Trump 
on March 27.  
 
Insert Figure 1 here. 
 
In Equation (2), the coefficient on the first interaction term (ß1) captures the causal effect of ES policies 
on stock performance during the crisis, whereas the coefficient on the second interaction term (ß2) 
reflects the additional effect during the second period when we expect the ES effect on stock returns to 
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To test the specific mechanisms of how ES policies help build resiliency, we add triple interaction terms 
to the above difference-in-differences regressions. The triple interaction between ES Treatment, 
Post_COVID, and a dummy indicating the firms in the top quartile of advertising expenditures 
(Investor-based ES) captures the effect from the customer (investor) loyalty mechanism. We also 
include a triple interaction with Post_fiscal instead of Post_COVID. The regressions include all possible 
double interactions.  We continue to include firm and day fixed effects and cluster standard errors by 
firm and day. We expect that the main effect we capture arises mostly in firms with high customer and 
investor loyalty. 
 
Our test uses the COVID-19 pandemic shock to detect causality by studying the effect of precrisis ES 
on financial performance during the crisis, because we measure ES with a lag of more than a year (when 
the pandemic was unforeseen) and also because in the narrow window during the COVID-19 crisis 
firms have very little time to respond.  Consequently, we attribute the stock market reaction to the 





2.1 Level of stock returns  
 
Table 2 presents results of regressing quarterly CAPM-adjusted log returns on firms’ ES ratings and 
other firm characteristics. In column 1, we use ES ratings as the only independent variable. In column 
2, we add industry fixed effects, and, in column 3, we add firm controls as independent variables. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. The effect of ES ratings on stock returns is significant 
at the 5% level or better, even after controlling for all the variables. The magnitude of the coefficient 
estimate suggests that one standard deviation increase in ES ratings is associated with a higher stock 
return in the first quarter of 1.8% on average (8.5 x 0.212). The economic magnitude of this coefficient 
encompasses the response of ES firms’ stock returns both to the pandemic and to the fiscal response at 
the end of the quarter. Firms with high Tobin's q, larger firms, firms with high cash, firms with lower 
leverage, firms with lower historical volatility, and firms with lower dividends all perform better (for a 
discussion of the role of cash and leverage, see Ramelli and Wagner [forthcoming]).  
 
Insert Table 2 here. 
 
To understand the connection between high- and low-rated ES policies and firms’ stock returns during 
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and (2) Verizon and Dish Network (telecommunications industry). Intel and Broadcom ES ratings are 
87% and 25%, respectively. Broadcom’s ES score is penalized by the risks it faces through its partner 
companies regarding climate change, hazardous materials, and waste. During the first quarter, Intel’s 
raw return is -9.6% and the CAPM-adjusted return is 17.3%. In contrast, Broadcom’s raw return is 
lower at -25% and its CAPM-adjusted return is 0.4%. A similar picture emerges from Verizon and Dish 
Network. Verizon’s ES rating is 63% with raw returns of 12.5% (-3.6% CAPM-adjusted) during first 
quarter of 2020, whereas Dish Network’s ES rating is lower at 18% with also lower raw returns of -
43.6% (-20.8% CAPM-adjusted). Dish Network’s ES susceptibility arises from its carbon footprint and 
pollution management. Of course these firms differ also with respect to size, profitability, and leverage, 
besides their ES ratings, but for this reason we control for firm characteristics in our cross-sectional 
regressions. 
 
Next, we conduct a difference-in-differences estimation that captures a tighter link between the 
performance of firms with high ES ratings and the COVID-19 pandemic by using daily data and two 
event dummies, Post_COVID and Post_fiscal. The treatment group of firms is represented by the 
dummy variable ES_treatment. A similar identification strategy is used in Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo 
(2017), though they do not have the benefit of daily data.  
 
Table 3 contains the results. Column 1 omits fixed effects, and column 2 includes firm and day fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm and day. The results show that the coefficient associated 
with the interaction between Post_COVID and ES_treatment is positive and significant at the 1% level. 
High ES-rated firms earn an average abnormal daily return of 0.45% relative to other firms from 
February 24 to March 17, for a cumulative effect of 7.2% (0.45% x 16). The economic significance is 
markedly larger than in the cross-sectional regressions of Table 2, because we are able to identify the 
response of stock returns to the pandemic with daily data. The results also show that the fiscal response 
dummy interacted with the high-ES dummy is insignificant. Overall, investors pay more for firms with 
higher ES ratings as the market collapses in the first quarter of 2020. We perform a test of the parallel 
trends assumption to establish that our results are not due to diverging behavior of highly rated ES firms 
relative to other firms even before the COVID-19 pandemic. The Internet Appendix contains a formal 
test by regressing daily abnormal returns from January 1, 2020, to February 23, 2020, on a dummy for 
high ES firms and finds an insignificant coefficient. Thus, the difference-in-differences specification 
satisfies the parallel trends assumption. 
 
To further document the resiliency of stock returns of high ES-rated firms, we conduct daily cross-
sectional regressions of cumulative CAPM-adjusted stock returns (from the start of the quarter to each 
day) on ES ratings, Tobin's q, firm size, cash to assets, financial leverage, return on equity, advertising 
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[forthcoming]). Figure 2 plots the daily loading on ES ratings, cash to assets, and leverage with 90% 
confidence bands constructed using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. The advantage of this 
analysis relative to the difference-in-differences regressions is that we do not commit to a particular 
event date to see how the relevancy of ES ratings changes over time. The disadvantage is that it does 
not give an estimate of the average change in stock returns. The figure shows the loading on ES ratings 
increasing dramatically at the end of February until it plateaus in mid-March. It describes the building 
up toward the effect we eventually find in the cross-sectional regressions of quarterly returns (note that 
the last point estimate in Figure 2 is the same as the point estimate in column 3 of Table 2).11 Prior to 
the COVID-19 shock, there is no significant return difference between ES firms and others, consistent 
with the results from the parallel trends test discussed above. The loading on cash to assets also increases 
reaching higher levels to that of ES, whereas the loading on leverage is negative and falls precipitously 
post-February, consistent with Acharya and Steffen (forthcoming) and Ramelli and Wagner 
(forthcoming). The reasons for the dramatic effect of ES on returns are analyzed in Section 4.  
 
Insert Table 3 and Figure 2 here. 
 
2.2 Volatility of stock returns 
 
Toward the resiliency hypothesis of ES firms, we also provide evidence of how the volatility of stock 
returns varies with ES ratings in the cross-section. In Table 4, we repeat the regressions in Table 2 using 
the standard deviation of daily raw log returns over the quarter as the dependent variable (columns 1, 
2, and 3) and the idiosyncratic volatility calculated as the standard deviation of CAPM-adjusted daily 
stock returns over the quarter (columns 4, 5, and 6). Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. In 
all regression specifications, we find that firms with high ES ratings experience a decrease in stock 
return volatility as compared to other firms (with 1% or better significance level). One standard 
deviation increase in ES is associated with a decrease in total volatility of 0.29 (-1.374 x 0.212), which 
represents close to 5% of the mean volatility of stock returns. 
 
Just as with stock returns, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis to better tie the variation in 
volatility of stock returns to the COVID-19 pandemic. For this analysis, we use a range-based measure 
of daily volatility, the daily high price minus the daily low price divided by the average price. We repeat 
the regressions in Table 3 using price-range volatility as the dependent variable.  
 
 
11 During the first quarter of 2020, many high-dividend stocks suspended dividend or share repurchase programs.  
Based on news headline searches on Factiva, we find that the earliest article with such news is dated March 20 
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Table 5 presents the results. The regressions show that the change in volatility can be traced to the 
Post_COVID treatment variable. Range-based volatility of stock returns for highly rated ES firms 
decreases relative to other firms. High ES-rated firms experience an average daily decrease in price-
range volatility of 0.63% relative to other firms from February 24 to March 17, for a cumulative effect 
of 10.1% (-0.63% x 16). Similarly to the evidence from stock returns, the economic magnitude of the 
ES effect increases when the regressions more clearly isolate the effect of the pandemic on the stock 
market. Table 5 also suggests that the fiscal policy treatment dummy has an added effect contributing 
to even lower volatility of high ES-rated firm returns relative to other firms.12 
 
Overall, the resiliency of high-rated ES stock returns is displayed both in the performance of mean 
returns and in the volatility of returns.  
 
Insert Tables 4 and 5 here. 
 
2.3 Operating performance 
 
Stock returns are forward-looking and incorporate information quickly and our tests above make use of 
that feature of capital markets. Accounting numbers are slower at incorporating information, especially 
as the effects from the pandemic keep unfolding. Here, we conduct a somewhat preliminary look at 
accounting performance metrics as they respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.  
 
We measure the change in operating performance from the fourth quarter of 2019 to the first quarter of 
2020 using three different metrics.  ROA is the return on assets, calculated as operating income before 
depreciation divided by book value of assets. OPM is the operating profit margin, calculated as 
operating income before depreciation divided by sales. AT is the asset turnover, calculated as sales 
divided by book value of assets. Following Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), we estimate median 
regressions using the least absolute deviation method to reduce the impact of large outliers in the 
accounting metrics. We include Tobin’s q to control for value and growth firms. In an alternative 
specification, we also include cash and leverage as controls.  We include industry fixed effects in all 
regressions. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and misspecification. 
 
 
12 We also analyze whether our results on stock returns and volatility can be explained by a lack of trading for ES 
stocks. We repeat the difference-in-differences regression specifications of Table 3, but with daily stock trading 
volume as the dependent variable. The results, reported in the Internet Appendix, show that daily trading volume 
significantly increases for highly ES-rated firms relative to other firms after the February 24 event date, suggesting 
that investors stepped in to stop the downward slide in prices. Hence, our stock return and volatility results cannot 
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Table 6 presents the results. In columns 3 and 4, we find that firms with high ES ratings have higher 
operating profit margins, consistent with predictions from Albuquerque, Koskinen, and Zhang (2019). 
One standard deviation increase in ES increases the change in OPM by 0.46 (2.181 x 0.212), or 6% of 
the sample mean change. In columns 5 and 6, we find that asset turnover is lower for firms with high 
ES ratings relative to other firms during the first quarter. High ES firms appear to increase profit margins 
even as sales decline. It is possible that these firms either increased prices or maintained their high-
profit margins despite the decrease in demand for their products, taking advantage of their customer 
loyalty consistent with work by Luo and Bhattacharya (2009), Servaes and Tamayo (2013), and 
Albuquerque, Koskinen, and Zhang (2019). We do not find that ES policies affect the return on assets 
during the first quarter of 2020. This is not surprising since ROA is the product of OPM and AT.  
 
Insert Table 6 here. 
 
 
3. Two Mechanisms of Resiliency 
  
We study two mechanisms that can potentially explain the resiliency of firms with high ES ratings: 
customer loyalty and investor segmentation. Both mechanisms predict lower systematic risk associated 
with high ES stocks. Luo and Bhattacharya (2009) and Albuquerque, Koskinen, and Zhang (2019) 
propose that customers are more loyal to firms with a strong reputation and that credibly pursue ES 
policies. In Albuquerque, Koskinen, and Zhang (2019), these firms benefit from lower price elasticity 
of demand to obtain higher profit margins. These higher profit margins lower operating leverage and 
reduce firms’ systematic risk. Intuitively, customer resiliency delivers stock price resiliency. 
Albuquerque, Koskinen, and Zhang (2019) present direct evidence of this mechanism by showing that 
changes in ROA are less positively correlated with the business cycle for high ES firms. The evidence 
in Table 6 that the operating profit margin increases for high ES firms relative to other firms is also 
consistent with this mechanism. We follow Albuquerque, Koskinen, and Zhang (2019) and others in 
using advertising expenditures to measure customer loyalty. We expect that the stock return effect we 
find is more pronounced for firms with high advertising expenditures. 
 
The second mechanism adapts the segmented capital markets model of Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner 
(2001), where polluting firms are only held by a subset of investors, since ES investors choose not to 
hold them. The higher systematic risk of polluting firms is linked to their owners’ lack of diversification. 
Similarly to customer loyalty, investor loyalty can contribute to the resiliency of ES stocks. The 
literature on Sustainable and Responsible Investments (SRI) shows that investors are more loyal, and 
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Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang 2011). Our proxy for ES investor preferences is constructed using 
the idea of revealed preference detailed in Section 2.13 We expect that stocks with investors with a 
preference for ES have less systematic risk and total risk. 
 
Table 7 displays the results for stock returns. In our tests, we expand the difference-in-differences 
regressions in Table 3 to a triple interaction between Post_COVID, ES_treatment, and a dummy 
indicating the firms in the top quartile of advertising expenditures (in columns 1 and 2), and to a triple 
interaction between Post_COVID, ES_treatment, and a dummy indicating the firms in the top quartile 
of ES investor preference (in columns 3 and 4). In columns 1 and 2, we find positive estimates of the 
triple interaction linked to advertising expenditures. Column 2 adds firm and day fixed effects to the 
regression. In both columns, standard errors are clustered by firm and day. Consistent with the 
predictions from the first mechanism, there is a significant average abnormal return earned by firms 
with high ES ratings and high advertising expenditures relative to firms with low ES ratings or low 
advertising expenditures after February 24. The effect is 0.53% in daily returns, which is 76% larger 
than the effect for low advertising but high ES firms (0.533/0.302 = 1.76). Columns 3 to 4 show positive 
estimates on the triple interaction of interest linked to ES investor preference.14 However, the estimates 
are not statistically significant. Economically, the point estimate on the ES investor preference triple 
interaction is half of the effect estimated in the triple interaction with advertising expenditures.  
 
Insert Table 7 here. 
 
Taken together, our return analysis shows strong support for the customer loyalty mechanism for 
resiliency, which is also consistent with the results regarding operating profit margins. We note that the 
two mechanisms discussed explain why high ES firms have lower market beta, but they do not fully 
explain the resiliency of ES firms. The reason is that the dependent variable in the tests above is the 
CAPM-adjusted stock return, which already accounts for differences in firm beta. Therefore, our results 
suggest that ES firms appear more resilient during the COVID-19 crisis than what investors expected 
before the crisis (as reflected by the precrisis firm beta). Still, it is also possible that the better 
performance of CAPM-adjusted returns is due to a decline in betas during the first quarter for high ES 
firms. Declining betas of ES stocks may be due to expectations that firm cash flows become less risky 
than low-ES stocks after the crisis, generating the increased loading on ES as shown in Figure 2.  
 
13 We also use an alternative investor preference measure of ES, which is the institutional ownership of a firm by 
pension funds and endowments. Starks, Venkat, and Zhu (2018) show the long-term investors prefer high ES 
stocks. We do not find that this measure has any effects. 
14 Cella, Ellul, and Giannetti (2013) show that, during market turmoil, such as the COVID-19 stock market crash, 
institutional investors with longer trading horizons sell their shares to a lesser extent than investors with short-
term trading strategies. To the extent that ES investors have long-term trading horizons, we would expect ES 











Table 8 reports the results of tests of the two mechanisms of resiliency for stock return volatility. We 
repeat the difference-in-differences regressions of Table 5 that uses the daily price range as a proxy for 
volatility. In columns 1 and 2, we find negative estimates of the triple interaction linked to advertising 
expenditures, but they are not statistically significant. In columns 3 and 4, we find significantly negative 
estimates on the triple interaction of interest linked to ES investor preference. Consistent with the 
predictions from the investor preference mechanism, there is a significant lower range-based volatility 
by firms with high ES ratings and high ES investor preference relative to other firms after February 24. 
In fact, the reduction in volatility for high ES firms appears to be concentrated in firms with high ES 
investor preference. 
 
Overall, our results show a strong effect of customer loyalty on stock returns and of investor ES 
preference on the volatility of stock returns. These results are consistent with the evidence in Gantchev, 
Giannetti, and Li (2019), who show that both customers and investors can provide market discipline 
when firms’ ES policies are lacking. This paper shows that influencing the behaviors of both consumers 
and investors is important for firm resiliency.  
 




We investigate two alternative explanations for our findings. One alternative explanation is that the oil 
price decline in the first quarter of 2020 affected particularly firms in the energy sector, which are 
known to score low in some dimensions of ES. Energy sector firms would then have significantly lower 
returns and higher volatility relative to other firms. The Internet Appendix shows that the results are 
even stronger after excluding firms in the energy sector from our sample.  
     
Another alternative explanation for our results is that some businesses, such as utilities, 
telecommunication, and financial industries, were considered “essential” and kept on operating in a 
normal fashion. This may have resulted in some resiliency of cash flows and stock returns for these 
businesses. To examine this explanation, we investigate the effect of ES ratings on stock returns by 
industry. We use the Fama-French classification for 12 industries. We repeat the regression 
specification in Table 3, allowing for triple interactions of Post_COVID with the ES_treatment and a 
dummy for each of the industries. Figure 3 shows the results. The figure shows that all but one industry 
display positive point estimates on the interaction between Post_COVID and the ES_treatment. Five of 
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Overall, the figure suggests that our findings are not associated with any particular industry, but 
encompass most industries. We go one step further to rule out this alternative explanation. It is possible 
that the ES_treatment is not randomly distributed across industries. We then construct an ES_treatment 
within each industry. This way we are exploiting cross-sectional variation in ES within each industry. 
The results are very similar to those displayed in Figure 3.  
 
Insert Figure 3 here. 
 
We conduct several additional robustness tests. First, we augment the list of firm-level variables in the 
cross-sectional regressions of quarterly stock returns and quarterly volatility of stock returns with 
operating leverage and measures of institutional ownership. Operating leverage, calculated as in 
Albuquerque, Koskinen, and Zhang (2019) and others, leads to a significant drop in the number of 
observations. Still, our results hold and are quantitatively similar. 
 
Second, we redo the analysis with MSCI’s ESG Research database, previously known as KLD. MSCI 
rates firms on a variety of strengths and concerns on seven attributes: community, diversity, employee 
relations, environment, product, human rights, and governance. We exclude corporate governance 
attributes from our analysis to focus on nongovernance aspects of ESG. We measure ES as the 
difference between the number of strengths and the number of concerns for each firm in 2016, the last 
year for which data is available. Given that the number of individual concerns and strengths in each 
attribute varies over time and across firms, we divide the number of strengths (concerns) for each firm-
year across all six ES categories by the maximum possible number of strengths (concerns) in all six 
categories for each firm. We then subtract the scaled concerns from the scaled strengths to obtain our 
alternative measure, which is bounded between -1 and 1. We find very similar results with the proxy 
for ES constructed with MSCI ES data as in Albuquerque, Koskinen, and Zhang (2019). While the 
MSCI ratings are from 2016 (the latest observation available), firm ES ratings are fairly sticky, which 
may explain the results. Another possible explanation for the similarity in results despite the lag in the 
measurement of the ES proxy is that investors care about firm reputation and credibility for ES policies 
and such reputation depends on a multiyear track record of ES performance. See the Internet Appendix 
for results with alternative ES ratings. 
 
Third, we change the Post_COVID to equal one from January 30 onward. January 30 is the day the 
World Health Organization declares the outbreak a public health emergency. The results corresponding 
to Table 3 and Tables 5, 7, and 8 are somewhat weaker because the coefficients of interest are smaller, 
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Finally, we consider the separate roles of E and S in ES. Using Refinitiv's scores, we show that the 
results in the paper are very similar if we use only the E or the S scores. This is perhaps to be expected 
because the correlation between the two scores is 0.73, and the correlation between the aggregate score 
ES and either E or S is over 0.91 (untabulated results). Firms appear to invest in both E and S 
simulataneously, a reality that limits our ability to evaluate their separate contributions.15 The last 
component in ESG, the governance score, has only a correlation of 0.52 with the E score and 0.43 with 
the S score (untabulated). When we rerun our analysis with the G score, we find that the G score explains 
the cross-section of stock returns, but only if other firm characteristics are not included in the regression. 
Thus, the results with the G score serve to reassure that our main results are not picking up a good 




The first quarter of 2020 was an extraordinary time for U.S. stock markets: first a calm period before 
the storm, then the fastest collapse ever, followed with a vigorous rally, all related to the unfolding of 
an unexpected, exogenous, health pandemic. We use this episode to study how ES firm policies 
conditioned the stock market response of firms. Specifically, we are interested in testing how customer 
and investor loyalty based theories of ES account for the stock price properties during the first quarter 
of 2020. We show that stock prices for firms with high ES scores perform much better than the prices 
for other firms. The stock market performance is especially strong during the market collapse for high 
ES stocks with high advertising. Operating profit margin of firms with high ES scores increase in the 
first quarter of 2020 even as sales decline consistent with a customer loyalty mechanism. In addition, 
the volatility of stock returns is lower for high ES stocks. Firms held by investors with a preference for 
ES display larger reductions in the volatility of stock returns. The evidence presented in this paper is 
consistent with the view that increasing the loyalty of both consumers and investors is an important 
antecedent for the resiliency of ES firms.  
 
Systematic unobservable differences between high and low ES firms unlikely explain our results, 
since we control for time-invariant unobservable firm effects in our difference-in-differences 
regressions. However,  ES policies could be possibly correlated with time-varying factors that affect 
firm value. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic, which threatens firms’ survival, could have led to 
increased investor beliefs that consumer demand for quality products will increase in the long run. As 
a result, there may be other mechanisms, apart from customer and investor loyalty to ES 
 
15 We also investigate a potential employee channel within S using Refinitiv's Workplace score. The results are 
similar to the main results in the paper (except that they are weak in the cross-sectional return regressions), which 
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policies, that also render the high-ES firms less susceptible to the COVID-19 shock. We leave the 
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Table 1.  Summary statistics 
 
This table reports the summary statistics (number of observations, mean, standard deviation [SD], and 
25th, 50th [median], and 75th percentiles) for all variables. Table A1 in the appendix defines all 
variables used in the paper.  
 
Variable  Obs. Mean SD 25% Median 75% 
Quarterly abnormal return 2,171 -22.971 42.482 -39.841 -17.397 2.803 
ES 2,171 0.289 0.212 0.136 0.208 0.384 
Investor-based ES 2,123 0.544 0.064 0.514 0.555 0.587 
Tobin’s q 1,971 2.268 1.882 1.098 1.545 2.600 
Size 1,973 7.138 1.919 6.062 7.180 8.329 
Cash 1,972 0.156 0.209 0.023 0.067 0.191 
Leverage 1,959 0.321 0.231 0.118 0.307 0.463 
ROE 1,971 -0.022 0.691 -0.002 0.092 0.158 
Advertising 2,171 0.007 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.002 
Historical volatility 2,171 2.328 1.274 1.451 1.962 2.793 
Dividend 1,973 1.735 2.365 0.000 0.905 2.628 
Volatility 2,171 6.128 2.954 4.446 5.452 7.037 
Idio. volatility 2,171 4.761 3.049 2.973 4.006 5.746 
ΔROA_qtr 1,536 -0.661 2.336 -1.024 -0.276 0.186 
ΔOPM_qtr 1,515 -7.989 66.460 -8.022 -1.632 1.269 
ΔAT_qtr 1,755 -1.236 3.255 -2.007 -0.258 0.091 
Daily abnormal return 134,689 -0.370 5.650 -1.633 -0.141 1.159 
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Table 2. Cross-sectional regressions for quarterly abnormal returns 
 
This table reports the results of regressions of the first quarter 2020 abnormal returns on firms’ ES under 
several specifications: without firm controls (specification 1), with industry fixed effects (specification 
2), and with industry fixed effects and firm controls (specification 3). Control variables are winsorized 
at the 1% level in each tail. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust. The regression constant is not 
reported for brevity. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  Table A1 in the appendix defines all 
variables used in the paper. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable Abnormal return Abnormal return Abnormal return 
ES 16.568*** 19.500*** 8.542** 
 (4.30) (5.56) (2.05) 
Tobin’s q   3.857*** 
   (8.25) 
Size   3.179*** 
   (4.85) 
Cash   27.209*** 
   (4.86) 
Leverage   -29.584*** 
   (-7.05) 
ROE   0.730 
   (0.49) 
Advertising   -9.797 
   (-0.24) 
Historical volatility   -4.427*** 
   (-3.62) 
Dividend   -2.378*** 
   (-4.93) 
Industry FE No Yes Yes 
Number of firms 2,171 2,171 1,958 
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Table 3. Difference-in-differences regressions for daily abnormal returns 
 
This table reports the results of a difference-in-differences estimation of daily abnormal returns during 
the first quarter of 2020. ES_treatment equals one for high ES firms, and zero otherwise. Post_COVID 
equals one from February 24 to March 31, 2020, and zero before this period. Post_fiscal equals one 
from March 18 to March 31, 2020, and zero before this period. Firm and day fixed effects are (not) 
included in Specification 2 (1). Standard errors are clustered by firm and day. The regression constant 
is not reported for brevity. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  Table A1 in the appendix defines 
all variables used in the paper. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable Abnormal return Abnormal return 
ES_treatment*Post_COVID 0.453*** 0.453*** 
 (3.06) (3.03) 
ES_treatment*Post_fiscal -0.568 -0.567 
 (-0.94) (-0.94) 
ES_treatment -0.000  
 (-0.00)  
Post_COVID -1.095***  
 (-3.66)  
Post_fiscal 1.280  
 (0.99)  
Firm FE No Yes 
Day FE No Yes 
Number of firm-days 134,689 134,689 
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Table 4. Cross-sectional regressions for volatility 
 
This table reports results for cross-sectional regressions of Volatility and Idio. Volatility during the first 
quarter of 2020 on firms’ ES under several specifications: without firm controls (specifications 1 and 
4), with industry fixed effects (specifications 2 and 5), and with industry fixed effects and firm controls 
(specifications 3 and 6). Control variables are winsorized at the 1% level in each tail. Standard errors 
are heteroscedasticity robust. The regression constant is not reported for brevity. The numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics. Table A1 in the appendix defines all variables used in the paper. *p < .1; 
**p < .05; ***p < .01. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Volatility Volatility Volatility Idio. Volatility Idio. volatility Idio. volatility 
ES -2.409*** -2.315*** -1.374*** -2.830*** -2.740*** -1.568*** 
 (-9.54) (-9.66) (-5.10) (-11.06) (-11.31) (-5.79) 
Tobin's q   -0.158***   -0.165*** 
   (-6.22)   (-6.58) 
Size   -0.105**   -0.157*** 
   (-2.14)   (-3.15) 
Cash   -0.821**   -0.622* 
   (-2.46)   (-1.95) 
Leverage   2.648***   2.856*** 
   (9.49)   (10.08) 
ROE   -0.017   -0.083 
   (-0.22)   (-1.09) 
Advertising   -1.814   1.434 
   (-0.94)   (0.82) 
Historical volatility   0.747***   0.786*** 
   (11.36)   (12.24) 
Dividend   0.058   0.094** 
   (1.55)   (2.39) 
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Number of firms 2,171 2,171 1,958 2,171 2,171 1,958 
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Table 5. Difference-in-differences regressions for the daily price range 
 
This table reports the results of difference-in-differences estimation for the daily price range during the 
first quarter of 2020. ES_treatment equals one for high ES firms, and zero otherwise. Post_COVID 
equals one from February 24 to March 31, 2020, and zero before this period. Post_fiscal equals one 
from March 18 to March 31, 2020, and zero before this period. Firm and day fixed effects are (not) 
included in Specification 2 (1). Standard errors are clustered by firm and day. The regression constant 
is not reported for brevity. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  Table A1 in the appendix defines 
all variables used in the paper. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable Daily price range Daily price range 
ES_treatment*Post_COVID -0.628*** -0.630*** 
 (-3.61) (-3.45) 
ES_treatment*Post_fiscal -0.613* -0.614* 
 (-1.95) (-1.88) 
ES_treatment -0.958***  
 (-11.30)  
Post_COVID 5.507***  
 (5.86)  
Post_fiscal 4.505***  
 (2.79)  
Firm FE No Yes 
Day FE No Yes 
Number of firm-days 134,689 134,689 
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Table 6. Cross-sectional regressions for operating performance 
 
This table reports the results of regressions of the operating performance’s quarterly change (the first 
quarter of 2020 minus the fourth quarter of 2019) on firms’ ES. The dependent variables are the 
quarterly changes of return on assets (specifications 1 and 2), operating profit margin (specifications 3 
and 4), and asset turnover (specifications 5 and 6). All variables are winsorized at the 1% level in each 
tail. Results in this table are based on LAD (least absolute deviation) regressions. All specifications 
include industry fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and misspecification. The 
regression constant is not reported for brevity. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  Table A1 in 
the appendix defines all variables used in the paper. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable ΔROA_qtr ΔROA_qtr ΔOPM_qtr ΔOPM_qtr ΔAT_qtr ΔAT_qtr 
ES -0.046 -0.020 2.210*** 2.181*** -0.297** -0.298* 
 
(-0.45) (-0.19) (3.12) (2.92) (-2.01) (-1.91) 
Tobin's q -0.052** -0.045 0.127 0.167 0.004 -0.008 
 
(-2.20) (-1.52) (1.08) (1.14) (0.14) (-0.27) 
Cash  -0.206  -0.565  0.477** 
 
 (-0.73)  (-0.19)  (1.97) 
Leverage  -0.232*  0.936  -0.064 
 
 (-1.66)  (0.81)  (-0.45) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of firms 1,536 1,529 1,515 1,508 1,755 1,744 
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Table 7. Triple interactions regressions for daily abnormal returns 
 
This table reports the results of triple interactions estimation for daily abnormal returns during the first 
quarter of 2020 using difference-in-difference-in-differences regressions. ES_treatment equals one for 
high ES firms, and zero otherwise. Post_COVID equals one from February 24 to March 31, 2020, and 
zero before this period. Post_fiscal equals one from March 18 to March 31, 2020, and zero before this 
period. Specifications 1 and 2 (3 and 4) are triple interaction regressions for high advertising (Investor-
based ES) firms. Firm and day fixed effects are (not) included in Specifications 2 and 4 (1 and 3). 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and day. The regression constant is not reported for brevity. The 
numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Table A1 in the appendix defines all variables used in the paper. 
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Abnormal return Abnormal return Abnormal return Abnormal return 
ES_treatment*Post_COVID*A
dvertising_high 
0.532** 0.533**   
 (2.35) (2.33)   
ES_treatment*Post_fiscal* 
Advertising_high 
-1.018** -1.019**   
 (-2.47) (-2.45)   
ES_treatment*Post_COVID*I
nvestorES_high 
  0.272 0.271 
   (1.08) (1.06) 
ES_treatment*Post_fiscal* 
InvestorES_high 
  0.125 0.127 
   (0.28) (0.28) 
ES_treatment*Post_COVID 0.302** 0.302** 0.283* 0.284* 
 (2.07) (2.05) (1.77) (1.74) 
ES_treatment*Post_fiscal -0.292 -0.292 -0.417 -0.418 
 (-0.51) (-0.51) (-1.08) (-1.06) 
All dummies and other possible 
interactions included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE No Yes No Yes 
Day FE No Yes No Yes 
Number of firm-days 134,689 134,689 131,654 131,654 
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Table 8. Triple interactions regressions for daily price range 
 
This table reports the results of triple interactions estimation for daily price range during the first quarter 
of 2020 using difference-in-difference-in-differences regressions. ES_treatment equals one for high ES 
firms, and zero otherwise. Post_COVID equals one from February 24 to March 31, 2020, and zero 
before this period. Post_fiscal equals one from March 18 to March 31, 2020, and zero before this period. 
Specifications 1 and 2 (3 and 4) are triple interaction regressions for high Advertising (Investor-based 
ES) firms. Firm and day fixed effects are (not) included in Specifications 2 and 4 (1 and 3). Standard 
errors are clustered by firm and day. The regression constant is not reported for brevity. The numbers 
in parentheses are t-statistics.  Table A1 in the appendix defines all variables used in the paper. *p < .1; 
**p < .05; ***p < .01. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Daily price range Daily price range Daily price range Daily price range 
ES_treatment*Post_COVID
*Advertising_high 
-0.022 -0.025   
 
(-0.11) (-0.11)   
ES_treatment*Post_fiscal*A
dvertising_high 
-0.444* -0.436   
 
(-1.71) (-1.34)   
ES_treatment*Post_COVID
*InvestorES_high 
  -0.879*** -0.875** 
 
  (-2.70) (-2.49) 
ES_treatment*Post_fiscal* 
InvestorES_high 
  -1.105** -1.101** 
   (-2.59) (-2.27) 
ES_treatment*Post_COVID -0.591*** -0.593*** -0.007 -0.011 
 (-3.32) (-3.11) (-0.05) (-0.06) 
ES_treatment*Post_fiscal -0.458 -0.462 -0.242 -0.244 
 (-1.43) (-1.36) (-1.01) (-0.87) 
All dummies and other possible 
interactions included 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE No Yes No Yes 
Day FE No Yes No Yes 
Number of firm-days 134,689 134,689 131,654 131,654 
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Figure 1. S&P 500 during the first quarter of 2020 
 
This figure plots the stock market path of S&P 500 during the first quarter of 2020. The red lines 
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Figure 2. Evolution of coefficients from cross-sectional regressions 
 
This figure plots the evolution of coefficients during the first quarter of 2020 from daily cross-sectional 
regressions of cumulative stock returns (from the start of the quarter to the day) on ES ratings, Tobin’s 
q, firm size, cash to assets, financial leverage, return on equity, advertising expenditures, dividend yield, 
historical volatility (all lagged 2019 values), and industry fixed effects. It plots the daily loading on ES 
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Figure 3. ES coefficients by industry from triple difference regressions 
 
Regression specification (2) in Table 3 is extended to allow for triple interactions of Post_COVID with 
ES_treatment and a dummy for each of the Fama and French 12 industries. The figure plots the point 
estimates of the triple interaction terms with 90% confidence intervals based on heteroscedasticity-
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Appendix 
Table A1. Variables, definitions, and sources 
 
 
Variable Definition Source 
ES 
Average between Refinitiv Environment Pillar Score and Social Pillar Score, divided by 100 and measured in 2018. Environment 
(Social) Pillar Score is the weighted average relative rating of a company based on the reported environmental (social) information 





We first measure an investor’s revealed ES preference as the value-weighted average ES score of its portfolio holdings for each 
quarter in 2018, and then average across the four quarters. A firm’s Investor-based ES is the weighted average of its investors’ 
ES based on first quarter 2019 holdings. InvestorES_high is an indicator for firms in the top quartile  
Our own calculations 
based on Thomson 
Reuter’s 13F and 
Refinitiv ESG 
Post_COVID Dummy variable that equals one from February 24 to March 31, 2020, and zero from January 1 to February 23, 2020  
Post_fiscal Dummy variable that equals one from March 18 to March 31, 2020, and zero from January 1 to 17 to March 17, 2020  
Tobin’s q 
Book value of assets (AT) minus the book value of equity (CEQ) plus the market value of equity (CSHO*PRCC), all divided by 
book value of assets (AT), measured in $US(2019) 
Compustat Annual 
Size Natural log of firms’ sales (SALE) plus one, measured in $US(2019) Compustat Annual 
Cash Cash holdings (CHE) over book assets (AT), measured in $US(2019) Compustat Annual 
Leverage Book value of debt (DLTT+DLC) over book assets (AT), measured in $US(2019) Compustat Annual 
ROE Net income (NI) over book equity (CEQ), measured in $US(2019) Compustat Annual 
Advertising 
Advertising expenditures (XAD) over book assets (AT). Missing values are set to zero, following past literature, measured in 




Volatility of daily logarithm return (i.e., the logarithm of gross return) of a stock during 2019 CRSP 
Dividend Dividend per share (DVPSX) over stock price (PRCC), multiplied by 100, measured in $US(2019) Compustat Annual 
Abnormal 
return 
The daily Abnormal return is the difference between daily logarithm return (i.e., the logarithm of gross return) of a stock and the 
CAPM beta times the daily logarithm return of the market, expressed as a percentage. The CAPM beta is estimated by using daily 
returns from 2017 and 2019, where the market index is S&P 500. The quarterly Abnormal return is measured over the whole 
period of the first quarter of 2020, i.e. the difference between the logarithm of the stock’s gross quarterly return and the CAPM 
beta times the logarithm of the market’s gross quarterly return 
CRSP, Capital IQ 
North America Daily 
Volatility Volatility of daily logarithm returns of a stock during the first quarter of 2020 
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Idio. volatility Volatility of daily Abnormal return of a stock during the first quarter of 2020 




Daily high-low price range of a stock during the first quarter of 2020, scaled by the midpoint of high and low daily prices. The 
high price (PRCHD) is the highest trade price for the date. Likewise, the low price (PRCLD) is the lowest trade price for the date 
Capital IQ North 
America Daily 
ΔROA_qtr 
Quarterly change (the first quarter 2020 value minus the fourth quarter 2019 value) in return on assets. Return on assets is 
operating income before depreciation (OIBDPQ) over book assets (ATQ), multiplied by 100 
Compustat Quarterly 
ΔOPM_qtr 
Quarterly change (the first quarter 2020 value minus the fourth quarter 2019 value) in the operating profit margin. Operating 
profit margin is operating income before depreciation (OIBDPQ) over sales (SALEQ), multiplied by 100 
Compustat Quarterly 
ΔAT_qtr 
Quarterly change (the first quarter 2020 value minus the fourth quarter 2019 value) in asset turnover. Asset turnover is sales 
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